The study of Thomas Aquinas often suffers from a fragmented approach, where his voluminous thoughts on virtue, law, and divinity are treated as discrete modules rather than a unified system. In *Aquinas on the Ethics of Happiness*, Joseph Stenberg attempts a "big-picture reconstruction" of the Scholastic philosopher’s moral framework. The goal is to move beyond the narrow debates of contemporary virtue ethics and recover the internal logic that drives Aquinas’s vision of the human life.
Stenberg’s work centers on the concept of *beatitudo*—often translated as happiness, though it carries a weight far heavier than modern emotional satisfaction. For Aquinas, ethics is not merely a set of rules to be followed, but a teleological journey toward a specific end. Stenberg argues that this end is an objective state of flourishing, rooted in the perfection of human nature rather than the subjective whims of the individual.
By re-examining these foundational elements, Stenberg positions Aquinas as a thinker whose relevance is not confined to the 13th century. The reconstruction suggests that our modern struggles with morality might stem from a loss of this "big-picture" coherence. In Stenberg’s view, understanding Aquinas requires us to see happiness not as a fleeting feeling, but as the final, structural purpose of human existence.
With reporting from Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Source · Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
